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COPYRIGHT IN UTILITARIAN OBJECTS:
BENEATH METAPHYSICS
Michael J. Lynch*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Patents and copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases
belonging to forensic discussions, to what may be called the metaphysics
of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very [subtle]
and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent. 1
Justice Story's familiar characterization of copyright as the "metaphysics of the law" 2 encourages the metaphysician in judges and
scholars who may enjoy struggling with impenetrable abstractions even
in cases where a common sense approach might reach simpler conclusions without the pleasure of deep cogitation. Among the opportunities
for metaphysicians provided by the Copyright Act of 1976, 3 the scheme
for protection of design features of useful articles stands out.4 The statutory attempt to protect decorative .aspects of an article while not
preventing imitation of utilitarian features has been the occasion of
particularly subtle analysis. This article will first demonstrate a crude,
literal and physical approach which might have produced far more
clarity, and results no less desirable. Then it will argue that the statutory definition setting the limits of statutory protection reaches contradictory results unless it is understood, in light of its evident purpose, to
restrict copyright to those aspects of a useful article in which a monopoly can be awarded without necessarily extending to the utilitarian features of the article.
Many find it surprising that useful articles may be protected by
copyright and so this article will begin with a brief summary of the
development up to and including the Copyright Act of 1976. Before
considering four principal cases, some attention will be given to the
legislative history, to the basic principles of statutory construction, and
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo; Associate Director of Law Library,
University of Toledo; J.D., University of Michigan.
1. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
2. Id.
3. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (current version at 17 U.S.C.

§§ 101-810 (1988)).

4. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1988) (works of authorship include "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works").
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to the policy considerations which govern what the law should seek to
achieve, and what it should seek to avoid.

II.

ANTECEDENTS

In 1873, Congress first extended copyright protection to three-dimensional works 5 by adding to the list of items which could be copyrighted "statue[s], statuary, and . . . models or designs intended to be
perfected [and executed] as works of the fine arts."' The phrase "intended . . . as works of the fine arts" appears to modify models or
designs only, rather than statuary.7 Still, it has been generally assumed
that a significant change occurred in 1909 when the list of subjects of
copyright included "works of art" without reference to the "fine" arts.'
The Copyright Office narrowly interpreted the scope of the purported change in the Copyright Act of 1909, 9 adopting regulations
which provided, "[plroductions of the industrial arts utilitarian in pur-

5. While two-dimensional useful articles exist, they have played an insignificant part in the
questions to be discussed. See, e.g., Beverly Hills Design Studio (N.Y.), Inc. v. Morris, 1989
Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) V 26,447 (involving paper patterns for clothes-making). In the House
Report on the Copyright Act of 1976, the discussion on the limited protection to be granted to
useful articles mentioned wall paper as an example of a useful article, and the design on such
paper as an "element" deserving of copyright protection. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 54-55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659-5801 [hereinafter
H.R. REP. No. 1476].
6. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1916).
7. Professor Perlmutter cites a "curious 1882 amendment" regulating the places in which
notice might be attached to "'molded decorative articles ... or articles of pottery or metal subject to copyright.'" Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful
Articles, 37 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y. 339, 342 (1990) (quoting Act of Aug.. 1, 1882, ch. 366, 22 Stat.
181). The language strongly implies that some lowly knick-knacks were already protected. Id.
8. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 211-13 (1954) (quoting Joint Hearing on S. 6330 and
H.R. 19853 Before the Comm. on Patents of the Senate and House of Representatives, 59th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1906) (testimony of Herbert Putnam, Esq., Librarian of Congress)).
It is interesting to note that, as to three-dimensional works, the statutory language necessarily
involved lawyers in making the determination of what was or was not a "work of art," a judgment
for which Justice Holmes had declared them unfit in a well-known passage: "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits." Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). Justice Holmes' conclusion might have
been questioned on the grounds that, whatever the fitness of lawyers and judges, Congress had
certainly required them to make such judgments in the case of three-dimensional works and could
be presumed to approve in the case of pictorial works as well. The approach of lawyers to the
question of what is a work of art is beautifully captured in the acute judgment of the Ninth
Circuit that "[a] thing is a work of art if it appears to be within the historical and ordinary
conception of the term art." Rosenthal v. Stein, 205 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1953), followed in
Bailie v. Fisher, 258 F.2d 425, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
9. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1077 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102
(1988)).
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pose and character are not subject to copyright registration, even if
artistically made or ornamented."' 10
This regulation, with minor clarifications, stood until the 1954 decision in Mazer v. Stein." In that case, the Supreme Court declared
that china statuettes of dancers, manufactured to be used as lamp bases, were entitled to copyright protection. It does not appear that this
decision upset existing Copyright Office practices-the challenged statuettes had been registered. Furthermore, Justice Douglas, in a separate
opinion, listed a variety of utilitarian articles which had been accepted
by the Copyright Office since 1910, including book ends, door knockers,
piggy banks and salt shakers. 2 Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that
the Mazer decision stimulated the interest of manufacturers and the
copyright bar because the number of registrations of ornamental designs of useful articles rose precipitously from 3,400 registrations in
1959 to 5,800 for the year 1960."3
Despite its prior history of accepting piggy banks and door knockers, following Mazer, the Copyright Office amended the applicable regulation twice, ending up with the following text, significant portions of
which were appropriated by the drafters of the 1976 Act:
If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that the
article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of
art. However, if the shape of a utilitarian article incorporates features,
such as artistic sculpture, carving, or pictorial representation,which can
be identified separately and are capable of existing independently as a
work of art, such features will be eligible for registration. 4
The emphasized language presumes an accepted standard for determining what is a work of art. By 1976, no generally accepted standard could be imagined. Learned commentators declared that a work
of art is anything certified as such by a member of the "artworld."' 15
On the other hand, other learned commentators opined that the same
work is or is not a work of art depending upon how it is displayed."6
These and other positions were argued with great complexity, leaving
observers confused about the meaning of art, even as the status of art-

10.

COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE REGISTRATION OF CLAIMS TO

Bull. No. 15, at 8 (1910), reprinted in Mazer, 347 U.S. at 212 n.23.
11. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
12. Id. at 221 (Douglas, J., separate opinion).
13. Design Protection: Hearing on S. 2075 and S. 2852 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 58-59
(1960) (testimony of Arthur Fisher, Register of Copyrights).
14. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1959) (revoked Jan. 1, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 966 (1978)) (emphasis added).
15. G. DICKIE, ART AND THE AESTHETIC: AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 36 (1975).
GOODMAN, 1990
When is Art?, in THE ARTS AND COGNITION 17 (D. Perkins & B. LePublished16.by N.
eCommons,
ondar ed. 1977).
COPYRIGHT,
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ists rose to unprecedented heights. Lawyers and judges with an exaggerated respect for artists then found themselves with no reliable way
of distinguishing a work of art from a parking lot light fixture.17
III.

COPYRIGHT ACT OF

1976

8

In the 1976 Act, the list of categories constituting the subject
matter of copyright was tightened and generalized.19 Under the 1909
Act,20 most three dimensional works had sought protection under the
category "works of art."2 1 In the new list, three-dimensional works
were included as "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works," a term
stripped of any "implied criterion of artistic taste, aesthetic value, or
intrinsic quality." 2 Without any such criteria, a bicycle was as much a
sculptural work as a bronze nude.

17. In Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, Judge Gesell demonstrated this incapacity in a graceful,
often-quoted passage:
These outdoor lights serve both to decorate and to illuminate. Indeed, during the day they
are exclusively decorative. They are a type of sculpture which is both original and aesthetically pleasing. Surely they would satisfy a Gropius or a Brancusifar more than would a
Rembrandt portrait, and to many they are more artistic than some examples of sculpture
found at such museums as the Corcoran or the Hirshhorn. Art through the ages has often
served a utilitarian purpose. The Caryatids of the Acropolis or Cellini's exquisite saltcellar
are two of many examples of traditional art serving such a purpose. There has always been
a close link between art and science. The forms represented by Esquire's fixtures emphasize
line and shape rather than the realistic or the ornate but it is not for the Register to reject
them on artistic grounds, or because the form is accommodated to a utilitarian purpose.
There cannot be and there should not be any national standard of what constitutes art and
the pleasing forms of the Esquire fixtures are entitled to the same recognition afforded
more traditional sculpture.
414 F. Supp. 939, 941 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
This very passage is quoted and endorsed by Professor Melville Nimmer, who introduced it
by saying, "it is difficult to quarrel with [Judge Gesell's] observations generally concerning the
nature of art, and specifically the artistic content of the lighting fixtures there in issue." 1 M.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

§ 2.08[B], at 2-102.1 (1991). The assumption, apparently

shared by a prominent jurist and a leading scholar, that Gropius, Brancusi, or anyone remotely
connected to reality would prefer a parking lot light fixture to a Rembrandt portrait should be
sufficient to convince doubters that the judgment of lawyers regarding artistic matters is confused
and unreliable. Extensive research has turned up no other writer who has called attention to the
absurdity of this contention.
18. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810 (1988)).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
20. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1988)).
21. Id. § 5(g), at 1077. Another category, "[dirawings or plastic works of a scientific ...
character," provided an alternative protection for works which may not have qualified as "works
of art." Id. § 5(i).
22. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 5, at 54.
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The definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works," limited the extent to which "useful articles"2 3 could claim inclusion in the
category:
Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their
form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the
design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that,
such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that
can be identified separatelyfrom, and are capable of existing indepen24
dently of, the utilitarianaspects of the article.
The derivation of the emphasized language from the Copyright
Office regulation is obvious; however, the change from "existing independently as a work of art" to "existing independently of the utilitarian
aspect" has unexpectedly raised questions susceptible to a highly metaphysical approach.
A.

Legislative History

The House Report on the Copyright Act of 1976,25 the most authoritative document in the legislative history, explained the pertinent
part of the definition of "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works" in
two paragraphs which have been cited in support of opposing positions
in several of the cases.2 6 That passage is quoted here, with emphasis
placed on those phrases most pertinent to the later controversy:
This part of the amendment is an adaptation of language added to the
Copyright Office Regulations in the mid-1950's in an effort to implement
the Supreme Court's decision in the Mazer case.
In adopting this amendatory language, the Committee is seeking to
draw as clear a line as possible between copyrightable works of applied
art and uncopyrighted works of industrial design. A two-dimensional
painting, drawing, or graphic work is still capable of being identified as
such when it is printed on or applied to utilitarian articles such as textile
23. The 1976 Act provides a definition:
A "useful article" is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to
portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. An article that is normally
a part of a useful article is considered a "useful article."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Such works are usually three-dimensional and protected as sculptural
works under section 102(a)(5). Id. The definition of "useful article" has sometimes been confusing
in application, but it has not led to the theoretical muddle which has arisen from the limitation of
the definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural work" which is the subject of this paper.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (emphasis added).
25. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 5.
26. See, e.g.. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 417 n.3 (2d Cir.
1985); Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 997 (2d Cir. 1980) (Weinstein, J., dissenting); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 908 (1979).
Published
by eCommons, 1990
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fabrics, wallpaper, containers, and the like. The same is true when a
-statute or carving is used to embellish an industrial product or, as in the
Mazer case, is incorporated into a product without losing its ability to
exist independently as a work of art. On the other hand, although the
shape of an industrial product may be aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the Committee's intention is not to offer it copyright protection
under the bill. Unless -the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies' dress,
food processor, television set, or any other industrial product contains
some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be
copyrighted under the bill. The test of separability and independence
from "the utilitarian aspects of the article" does not depend upon the
nature of the design-that is, even if the appearance of an article is
determined by esthetic (as opposed to functional) considerations, only
elements, if any, which can be identified separatelyfrom the useful article as such are copyrightable. And, even if the three-dimensional design
contains some such element (for example, a carving on the back of a
chair or a floral relief design on silver flatware), copyright protection
not cover the over-all conwould extend only to that element, and would
27
figuration of the utilitarianarticle as such.
The suggestion that separate identification of an element might be
achieved "physically or conceptually" is best understood in light of the
examples provided of the carved chair and the flatware relief design,
and the graphic design on fabric or wallpaper. These examples also
help in giving a meaning to the statutory language "capable of independent existence" which does not necessarily coincide with "separately
identifiable." In the Second Circuit, however, the concept of "conceptually separable" has swallowed up the statutory language in circumstances far removed from the narrow examples of the Report.2
The quoted passage also refers twice to the "shape" or "over-all
configuration" of a useful article, expressing clearly that copyright protection should not extend to that shape. The prominent cases involving
the question,2 9 however, all involve protection for the entire shape of an
article.3 In the discussion of the case of Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 1 this

27.

H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 5, at 54-55 (emphasis added).

28. See infra notes 95-140 and accompanying text.
29. See generally Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir.
1987); Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985); KieselsteinCord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d
796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
30. The primary meaning of the noun "shape" refers to visible surface or outline of an
object. The best definition is stated in Webster's New International Dictionary: "Spatial form
with respect to a relatively constant contour or periphery." WEBSTER's NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
2302 (2d ed. 1957).
31. 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
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article will consider the possibility that as to the shape of a useful article the apparent clarity of the House Report may contradict the statutory language when the housing of a useful article makes no contribution to its utility. The possibility was already illustrated by the facts in
Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., Inc.3 2 In any event, the cases from
the Second Circuit have disregarded this limitation entirely.3 3
Although in enacting the statute Congress had modified the language of the prior regulation, substituting "existing independently of
the utilitarian aspects" for "existing independently as a work of art,"
the House Report repeated the earlier phrasing as if to imply that the
two were equivalent. Opinions under the 1976 Act have never openly
argued that an article may not be protected because it is not a work of
art; however, arguments for protection have usually emphasized the artistic qualities of the article in question. A peculiar class of useful objects will be discussed, such as paperweights, whose utility springs from
simple physical properties (such as mass) to demonstrate that this limitation is ambiguous, and that a plausible interpretation is available
which could obviate many difficulties.34
B.

Statutory Construction

The statute appears to require that two qualifications be met. The
element or feature to be protected should be "identified separately
from, and . . . capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. '"35 Elementary principles of statutory construction
require that both of the two elements, "identified separately" and "capable of existing independently," are given independent meaning and
are applied in each contested case. 36
As will be seen, however, the analysis in the reported decisions
ignores the requirement "capable of existing independently" while emphasizing separate identification, and concentrating on the statement
from the legislative history that such identification may be physical or
conceptual.3 7 The line of analysis in the Second Circuit which considers
only "conceptual separability" has gone so far as to grant protection to
so-called "artistic elements" or "sculptural elements" of an article
without specifying what those elements are, or how they may exist independently of the utilitarian aspects of the article.3 8
32. 259 F. Supp. 733, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
33. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 994 (2d Cir. 1980)
(Weinstein, J., dissenting).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 142-51.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
36. "In construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress
used." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (citing United States v. Menasche, 348
U.S. 528,
538-39 (1955)).1990
Published
by eCommons,
37. See infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 94-137 and accompanying text.
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Professor Nimmer has considered the phrase "capable of existing
independently" in connection with two cases, Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer3
and Kieselstein-Cordv. Accessories by Pearl,Inc.,' 0 and asked, "[d]oes
this require physical, as distinguished from conceptual, separability?"' 1
He concluded that physical separability was not required.' His judgment was based on the House Report's reference to the statuettes involved in the case of Mazer v. Stein'3 as an example of a work which
could "exist independently."" Professor Nimmer insisted that since the
statuette was the base, and the base was utilitarian, that Mazer could
not be harmonized with the statute unless only "conceptual separability" was necessary for copyright protection.'
There are, however, reasons to conclude that the carved surfaces
of the statuettes in Mazer are capable of existing independently of the
utilitarian aspects in more than a "conceptual" way. Furthermore, and
more significantly, Professor Nimmer did not consider whether his conclusion meant that the language "capable of existing independently"
could therefore be ignored, yet that is the necessary implication of his
judgment. This proposition is barred by the basic principle referred to
above and sometimes expressed: "[I]t is presumed the Congress did not
use superfluous words.""'
This proverbial assumption of legislative proficiency would seem to
demand an interpretation of "capable of existing independently" which
requires that the utilitarian article be capable of physical existence
without the pictorial or sculptural aspects, and vice versa. Such an interpretation, paradoxically, makes surplusage of the language "can be
identified separately," since it is difficult (impossible?) to imagine a
useful article divided into two physical entities which cannot be identified separately.
It will be argued, however, that emphasis on the literal interpretation of "capable of existing independently" suggested above would have
provided reasonable and predictable results in the cases which have
produced a theoretical muddle.

39.
40.

591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).

41.

M.

NIMMER,

supra note 17, § 2.08[B], at 2-97.

Id.
347 U.S. 201 (1954).
44. M. NIMMER, supra note 17, § 2.08[B], at 2-98.
45. Id.
46. In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 592 (C.C.P.A. 1977). Criticism of Professor Nimmer's
disregard of the statutory language was expressed early by David A. Gerber. See Gerber, Book
Review, 26 UCLA L. REv. 925, 939 (1979).
42.
43.
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C. Policy Considerations
The reasons why Congress has chosen to grant copyright protec-

tion to three-dimensional works of art, but not to three-dimensional
works of utility, are not stated explicitly. At the outset of the preparation of the Copyright Act of 1976, the Register of Copyrights reported
to Congress the conclusion that protection for useful articles was not
desirable.'
The fear expressed by the Register that competition will be in
some way restrained is not developed or analyzed as the legislation proceeded to passage. Since copyright protection gives a nearly absolute
monopoly in the copying and sale of works protected, this conclusion
leaves unspoken the reason why the restraint of competition is acceptable as to a particular literary, musical, or artistic work, but not acceptable in the case of a useful article. We may be satisfied with an
intuitive decision that this is so, but it is awkward to assert that a novel
kitchen utensil is more significant than the novels of Faulkner or a
mousetrap more important than Mickey Mouse. 4'

47. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION,
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT

LAW 13 (Comm. Print 1961).
We do not believe . . .that it would be appropriate to extend the copyright law to industrial designs as such. In this area there is a delicate balance between the need for protection on the part of those who originate and invest in a design, and the possible effect of
protection, if overextended, in restraining competition.
Id.
48. The "monopoly" protection afforded by copyright is significantly qualified by the exclusion of ideas from copyright protection; however, this limitation is of uncertain application in the
case of useful articles. The exclusion of ideas now found in the 1976 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), was
expressly formulated in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954), but when applied to literary
works, almost certainly reflects common understanding from far earlier. In Baker v. Selden, the
creator of a system of accounting was denied the right to prevent copying of forms necessary to
the use of the system published in his copyrighted explanation. 101 U.S. 99 (1979). While the
idea/expression distinction is usually attributed to the case, the court's emphasis was on the denial
of protection to practical systems, except under patent.
The freedom of ideas contributes to the progress of science and useful arts by allowing later
creators to make use of the essence of earlier contributions. The distinction between ideas and
expression often presents difficulty in verbal works, but its application becomes completely unpredictable in the case of musical or pictorial works, or the sculptural works generally involved in the
useful article problem. A statement of the idea or ideas expressed in such a work can be formulated at any level of generality and will in most cases be at the whim of the critic. For that reason,
the right to copy ideas, rather than expression, has little meaning in connection with such works.
The difficulty in identifying the unprotected ideas in such cases also disables the pro-competitive effects of the denial of copyright or the defense to infringement, which follows from demonstration that a work expresses ideas which can only be expressed in one way or in a very limited
variety of ways. See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir.
1971); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (Ist Cir. 1967); NEC Corp. v. Intel
Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
A corollary of the freedom of ideas is the complete defense to infringement actions afforded

Published by eCommons, 1990

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 16:3

The judgment that a free market is more important in useful articles than in art and literature is corroborated in related areas of American patent and trademark law. Patents while in some ways broader
than copyright, protect for a much shorter period, and an applicant
must meet far more stringent requirements. The device for which patent protection is sought is carefully examined, and measured against
standards of novelty,4 9 non-obviousness,5 0 and utility. 51 Each of these
three requirements is a barrier which disqualifies many interesting innovations. The Copyright Office, on the other hand, provides only a
cursory examination to works seeking registration and imposes the lowest imaginable test of originality. The policy that useful articles should
meet the stringent tests of patent rather that the minimal tests of copyright is also seen in the limitations of design patents and the trade dress
aspect of trademark law.
Design patents protect not utility, but ornamental aspects of design.5 2 Such patents cannot substitute for copyright protection of artistic aspects of useful objects, because the Patent Office approval is not
swift, applications are often denied for obviousness or lack of novelty,
and patents which have been granted are regularly invalidated if challenged.53 Furthermore, the protection does not extend to elements of
design which are functional rather than ornamental, 54 a distinction
comparable to the "separability" test in copyright law.
The law of trademark and unfair competition also reveals an analogous concern in disallowing "trade dress" protection for the functional
features of an object's design. 55 The meaning to be attributed to func-

by independent creation. But liability for "unconscious copying," first seen in cases of musical
composition, has eliminated any reliable safe harbor for creators once they have been aware of the
earlier work, no matter how honestly they may have avoided imitation. See ABKCO Music, Inc.
v. Harrisongs, 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983); Fisher v. Dillingham, 298 F.2d 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
Since industrial designers are as likely as pop musicians to be aware of earlier work in their field,
fear of infringement should have some discouraging effect on their creativity.
Thus, some significant constraints on the copyright monopoly may be ineffective or uncertain
in the case of useful articles and other sculptural works. While designers may feel constrained by
the possibility of infringement, there is no indication that Congress took this into account in limiting the applicability of copyright in useful articles.
49. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
50. Id. § 103.
51. Id. § 101.
52. Id. § 171.
53. See Lindgren, The Sanctity of the Design Patent: Illusion or Reality? Twenty Years of
Design Patent Litigation Since Compco v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 10 OKLA. CITY UL. REV. 195 (1985).
54. Kwik-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg. Co., 758 F.2d 167, 172 (6th Cir. 1985).
55. For a summary of the contrasting definitions of functionality in several circuits of the
United States Court of Appeals, see Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. RaV.
1341 (1987).
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tionality in this context is somewhat unsettled, but may exclude from
protection a wider range of features than those excluded from copyright, even extending to purely decorative features which carry with
them a great competitive advantage. 56 The unsettled definition of this
limitation in the federal courts does not affect the conclusion that here,
as in the patent and copyright laws, particular concern has been shown
for the preservation of competition in the case of utilitarian objects.
The power of state law to outlaw copying of functional aspects of utilitarian objects was preempted by the Supreme Court's decisions in
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.57 and Cornpco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc.58 Any question as to whether the erosion of the general
holding of those cases had extended its application to useful articles
was presumably laid to rest by the decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.59
Numerous proposals for copyright-like, short-term protection for
designs of useful objects have died in Congress.6" Another died in the
101st Congress. 1 While such bills typically provide a greater range of
protection than that provided by the Copyright Act, they typically exclude designs "dictated solely by a utilitarian function of the article
that embodies it."6 Failure to pass such legislation is strongly related
to fears (and desires) for the restriction of competition in replacement
auto parts.
A less important motivation for limiting protection of useful designs may arise from the relative status of art and industrial design.
There is some evidence that the Copyright Office has in the past sought
to limit its responsibilities to "high-toned" subject matter.6 3 The reiteration of the "fine arts" in Copyright Office regulations, following the
deletion of that phrase from the 1909 Act, is some indication of such

56. The theory of "aesthetic functionality" has been used to deny trademark protection to
ornamental features merely because they are attractive to customers, and thus are "an important
ingredient in the commercial success of the product." Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d
339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952). The application of this idea has been limited in the Ninth Circuit.
Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981). Its reception in other
circuits has been qualified; see authorities collected in J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 7:26D (1984 & Supp. 1991).
57. 376 U.S. 225, reh'g denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964).
58. 376 U.S. 234, reh'g denied, 377 U.S. 913 (1964).
59. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
60. See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
908 (1979).
61. H.R. 902, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
62. Id.
63. See Derenberg, Commercial Prints and Labels: A Hybrid in Copyright Law, 49 YALE
L.J. 1212, 1215 (1940).
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an attitude.64 Along the same line is the Copyright Office's internal
65
insistence on "artistic features" as the element to be protected, despite the declaration in the House Report that the adoption of the term
"pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work" was deliberately used to avoid
implications of artistic value." While the rationale of supporting competition suggests that works of utility are more important than works of
art, the pro-art rationale suggests they are less important. The post1976 cases make much of the artistic significance of challenged works,
but pay no attention to whether the case actually raises a possibility
that a functional design might be monopolized.
D.

Summary

Without belaboring the meager evidence of Congressional motivation, it is clear from the statute itself that utilitarian aspects of useful
articles are intended to be outside the scope of copyright protection. It
may be of use in evaluating the cases to consider a statement of this
policy. For example, a designer may not use copyright to capture the
value of functional aspects of a useful article. The designer, on the
other hand, may capture the value of a decorative design of a useful
article, no matter what a powerful market advantage beauty may provide, so long as the functional aspects are not necessarily included in
the protection. 7 It is hoped that this statement of the manifest statutory intent is uncontroversial. The statutory language, of course, does
not explicitly follow that statement, but it may be plausibly interpreted
to that effect.
The simplest and most literal application of the statute to a design
would demonstrate that the pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features for
which protection is sought can exist apart from any utilitarian aspects
of the article, and that the utilitarian aspectscan exist apart from these
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural aspects. No courts have demonstrated
such a two-step application. It should be obvious that, if such a demonstration is successful, there is no possibility whatsoever of impairing
competition as to utilitarian aspects of design. Only when such a demonstration is difficult to imagine should it be necessary to rely on the
idea of "conceptual separability." In such a case, particular attention
must be paid to insure that the protection considered does not extend to
utilitarian aspects of the article. The cases, however, appear to have

64.
65.

37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1960); see supra text accompanying note 14.
LIBRARY

OF CONGRESS

COPYRIGHT

OFFICE, COMPENDIUM

OF COPYRIGHT

OFFICE

§ 505.03 (1984) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES].
66. See supra text accompanying note 22.
67. To the extent the doctrine of "aesthetic functionality" has life, this choice does not align
perfectly with the law applicable to trademarks and trade dress.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/3
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placed far more emphasis on the artistic aspects to be protected, than
on the utilitarian aspects to be left free. This article attempts to show
that a primary focus on preserving the free use of utilitarian features is
consistent with broad protection for artistic form.
IV.

THE EARLY CASES

Analysis of the question of the extent of protection of design of
useful articles has been stimulated greatly by the decisions in two contrasting cases shortly after the effective date of the Copyright Act of
1976.8' In the first of these cases, Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer,6 9 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed
the district court's issuance of a writ of mandamus by directing the
Register of Copyrights to register a lighting fixture which the Register
had refused, in accordance with regulations under the 1909 Act.7" In
the second case, Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc.,71 the
Second Circuit reversed a summary judgment for a defendant who
mass-produced copies of two belt buckles, one of which was registered
under the 1909 Act, and the other under the 1976 Act. 2
Despite the limited application of the 1976 Act in these two cases,
they have been the basis for all later discussions of the problem. Two
additional cases with outstanding facts for illuminating difficulties have
since been decided in the Second Circuit. 3 Opinions in these later
cases offered interesting but unsatisfying theoretical proposals. This article will consider in depth the four cases referred to' noting in particular two approaches missing from the decisions. The 'first approach is a
vigorous attempt to find an important element of the design which can
physically exist independent of the utilitarian function. The second involves concentration not on the artistic elements to be protected, but on
the utilitarian aspects which must be left free. By evaluating the extent
to which copyright protection in a given case may inhibit competition
as to utilitarian rather than aesthetic aspects, it is possible to determine
whether the denial of protection is required for policy reasons.
A.

Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer

Esquire arose under the 1909 Act, which protected three-dimensional shapes primarily as "works of art."' 74 The district court granted
68. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (current version at 17 U.S.C.
101-810 (1988)).
69. 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
70. Id. at 806.
71. 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
72. Id. at 994.
Brandir Int'l, Inc.
v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987); Carol
Published73.by eCommons,
1990
Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
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summary judgment against the Register of Copyrights in a mandamus
action, and the court of appeals reversed."' At issue was the Copyright
Office policy excluding the overall shape of a utilitarian article, a modern parking lot light fixture. The regulation read in relevant part: "if
the shape of a utilitarian article incorporates features . . .which can
be identified separately and are capable of existing independently as a
work of art."7 6
This language directs that the "features" which may be protected
should be identified separately from the shape. The 1976 Act differs
significantly, requiring that the "features" be identified separately from
the utilitarian aspects of the article.7 The House Report did not adequately recognize this difference, referring to "shape" and "over-all
configuration" as unprotectable.7 a Despite the significant difference between the regulation and the comparable provisions of the 1976 Act,
the court of appeals used the House Report to buttress its approval of
the Copyright Office's restrictive interpretation of its regulation. 79
The items like candlesticks, inkstands and chandeliers which the
Copyright Office had accepted, and Justice Douglas had listed in his
separate opinion in Mazer v. Stein,a0 were weakly distinguished in a
footnote.8 1 Also mentioned, without satisfactory grounds for distinction,
was Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercrafta2 in which the same regulation at
issue in Esquire was held to permit copyright in a simulated antique
telephone used as the casing for a pencil sharpener, since the sharpener
and its casing could be physically separated."3
Under the 1976 Act, however, existence as a "work of art" is unnecessary; separation and independent existence are to be attributed to
"sculptural features" and "utilitarian aspects."'8 4 There is no apparent
reason why the overall shape should not be a "sculptural feature" if it
is unnecessary to the utilitarian properties of the article.8 5

75.

Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908

(1979).
76. See supra text accompanying note 14. The regulation may have been more restrictive
than Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), permitted.
77. For the definition in the 1976 Act, see supra text accompanying note 24.
78. See supra text accompanying note 27.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Esquire, 591 F.2d at 800-01.
347 U.S. 201, 221 (1954) (Douglas, J., separate opinion).
Esquire, 591 F.2d at 802 n.19.
259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
Esquire, 591 F.2d'at 802 n.19.
See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (current version at 17

U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988)).
85. The Brief of the Copyright Office, quoted extensively in Esquire, contended vigorously
that the overall shape of a utilitarian object could never be protected without frustrating the intent
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/3
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The approach suggested by Ted Arnold, which may be characterized as the "rip-its-guts-out" approach, has obvious application to a
lighting fixture. Pull out the wires, socket and bulb, and you have two
separated and independently existing entities. The 1976 Act eliminated
the question as to whether the wireless casing is art or not, leaving only
the elements of separate identification and independent existence,
which both seem to be present for the utilitarian and sculptural aspects
of the light fixtures. The court of appeals in Esquire noted Plaintiff's
concession that copyright protection was sought only for the housing of
the light fixtures.88 Without declaring that an application so limited
would have met the requirements, the court concluded that because the
applications were not so limited, the Register of Copyrights did not
abuse discretion in refusing registration."7
Professor Denicola has noted the contention that the housing alone
fits the statutory limits, and dismissed it, perhaps too abruptly:
Reliance on this simplistic notion of physical separation, however, is misplaced. The legislative history unequivocally indicates that pictorial
works adorning useful articles are entitled to copyright, yet the pattern
dyed into a bolt of cloth or painted on a china cup cannot be physically
detached from the object itself. In addition, some features of utilitarian
objects that can be physically separated are clearly not intended to fall
within the scope of copyright. An ordinary television cabinet may be
physically removed from the set itself, yet protection will not be forthcoming. Physical separability is a poor touchstone, inaccurate as a descriptive concept, and 'devoid of normative implications. The legislative
history acknowledges the necessity of a more esoteric approach, referring
at one point to "some element that, physically or conceptually, can be
identified as separable." The notion of conceptual separability, however,
can be little more than an invitation to thoughtful analysis. It has meaning only in the context of a specific normative theory or model. 8

of Congress. Id. at 801. From 1914, until the time of Esquire, more than 70 design protection bills
died in Congress. Id. at 800 n.12. Yet, if the lighting fixtures at issue were protected by the
copyright law, widespread protection for industrial designs would, in the Register's view, follow.
Id. at 801. Consumer products-garments, toasters, bathtubs, and industrial products designed to
have aesthetic appeal--subway cars, computers, etc., all would have a possibility of protection. Id.
The Copyright Office continues to insist that overall shape of a useful article may not be
protected. The Compendium of Copyright Office Practices includes a "separability test" which
declares that registration "can be considered only on the basis of separately identifiable pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features which are capable of independent existence apart from the shape
of the useful article." COPYRIGHT OFICE PRACTICES, supra note 65, § 505.02 (emphasis added).
The departure from the statutory language is obvious.
86. Esquire, 591 F.2d at 806. The claim noted by the court of appeals was not supported by
the application and belatedly raised on oral argument.
87. Id.
88. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in
Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 730-31 (1983).
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It is illogical here to dismiss physical separability because it cannot be applied to all cases. Indeed, Congress has shown an intention to
provide protection for features beyond the physically separable, though
it is unlikely that this intent went much beyond the examples given of
patterns on paper or cloth, or carved into furniture. Such cases may
require an "esoteric approach," "thoughtful analysis," and "a specific
normative theory or model." When the feature for which protection is
sought can be physically separated from the utilitarian work, however,
the requirements of the statute are met in an unmistakable way, and
further inquiry is unnecessary.
The only part of the passage quoted that directly opposes this conclusion is the unsupported assertion that a physically removable television cabinet cannot be protected. An ordinary television cabinet,
though, is unoriginal, and fails to meet even the minimal requirements
of creativity;-it is a familiar box with moldings and knobs. If a picture
tube is enclosed in the tummy of a naked lady, or Mickey Mouse, or
some outlandish modern sculpture, why should the removable cabinet
not receive copyright protection? Certainly protection of such an overall shape would not affect competition in utilitarian aspects.
There is a sense, however, in which the housing of the light fixture
or of the television retains some utility after the electronics are removed. Professor Denicola notes Professor Nimmer's observation that
even the dancing figures in Mazer could not meet a test of strict physical separability since a lamp base is utilitarian.8 9 Stating the objection
concretely, the lamp base holds the light bulb up off the ground, allowing illumination to cover a wider area. Similarly, the television cabinet raises the picture tube off the ground for a better viewing angle.
Esquire was decided under regulations intended to implement the
Supreme Court's decision in Mazer. The district court relied on similarities to the Mazer case and it was then necessary for the court of
appeals to distinguish the cases. 90 This was done by asserting that the
Mazer lamp base could exist "independently as a work of art."9 ' This
approach, however, does not fairly meet Judge Gesell's contention that
the Esquire lamp base is itself a piece of modern, abstract sculpture. 92

89. Id. at 730 n.105 (citing 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER.ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[B][3] (1982)).
90. Esquire, 591 F.2d at 804-05.
91. Id. at 804.
92. See supra note 17 (quoting Judge Gesell's critical judgment). Justice, Holmes' advice
that lawyers and judges refrain from making aesthetic judgments here meets the twentieth century bourgeois determination not to be shocked by anything a hustler may contend is art. See
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Furthermore, the different requirements of the 1976 Act would change
the analysis considerably. Under the new formula, the object is to be
severed physically or conceptually into two components. Arguably, the
component for which protection is not sought must remain useful when
the aesthetic component is removed. If the artistic lamp base exists independently, what is to be made of the remainder, a light bulb with
wires lying on the table (Mazer) or on the ground (Esquire)? Is it still
useful?
The utilitarian aspect of a base, which lifts the fixture off the
ground, springs not from the conception of the designer, but from the
simple physical properties of the object (in this case, height). The argument that such physical properties should not be relevant in the determination of separability and independent existence will be postponed
for a later discussion of a variety of examples of the problem. 93 The
facts in Esquire, however, permit the elimination of this more limited
utilitarian aspect by a second tactic which can be characterized as the
"hacksaw" approach.
In the "hacksaw" approach, two objects are separated and capable
of existing independently when the top part of the lighting fixture's pole
is either physically or conceptually severed, keeping together the segment enclosing the light bulb and the last few inches of the upright
member and leaving behind all wiring. One of the separated objects is
the casing, excluding for the upright (a sculptural work); the other is a
light bulb hanging from a pole (a useful object). This approach is easily applied to the Mazer facts where the'dancing figures on the surface
of the lamp bases could be peeled away from an inner cylinder. 94 While
the designer may object to the mutilation of his work conceptually or
physically, the manufacturer will realize that copyright protection for
the fragment provides all the defense against imitators that is required.
The analysis assumes that lighting fixtures do not achieve their
function of area lighting in any unique way that cannot be accomplished without imitating the design of the fixture. If the Esquire housing had unique properties which enhanced the diffusion of light, the

supra note 8 (description of Justice Holmes' admonition). Professor Nimmer, discerning some
strange utility in a strip of fabric suspended from poles,-noted the "Running Fence" of the notorious charlatan, "Christo," as an example of a work of art indistinguishable from a useful object.
M. NIMMER, supra note 17, § 2.08[B], at 2-97. It is not clear whether Professor Nimmer believed
that copiers of this stunt ought to pay royalties to Christo.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 140-51.
94. A more challenging set of facts would have been presented in Mazer had the lamp base
been made of a translucent material allowing the light to be diffused from the entire body of the
dancer. Again, the utility which comes from simple phyiical properties is involved, and the application of the statute is highly awkward unless some notice is taken of the special nature of this
sort of usefulness.
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ease of maintenance, or any other functional property, then the proposed physical division would not have the effect of separating the useful from the decorative, and copyright protection would not follow.
Thus, under the 1976 Act, light fixtures, whether in the shape of
Balinese dancers or in the shape of an upright pole from which extends
a hollow translucent Frisbee large enough to hold a light bulb, should
be copyrightable, despite the reluctance of the Copyright Office. If additional utility is found in the upright member of the housing which
lifts the light bulb from the ground, protection may be extended only to
the physically severable portion of the housing which encloses the bulb,
thus preventing copiers from direct competition with the original. This
may not be what Congress hoped to achieve, but it seems to be what
they enacted.
This literal approach to the statute protects only decorative aspects
of the design. That feature for which protection is claimed must be
closely analyzed to determine whether any functional aspect would be
included. 95 If so, the utilitarian aspects have not been separated, and
copyright protection will be unavailable. The pro-competitive policy underlying the act is fully served by this approach. Had protection been
granted in Esquire, it is difficult to imagine that competition in the
field of parking lot light fixtures would have been impaired, or that
progress in fixture design would have been impeded. These highly
praised lighting fixtures were left unprotected by the Esquire decision,
yet the design does not appear to have swept the field.
B.

Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc.

Some cases achieve academic fame through convenient pairing
with a contrasting decision. The Esquire case was coupled with an alternative view when the Second Circuit decided Kieselstein-Cordv. Accessories by Pearl, Inc.96 This case involved the blatant copying of a
fashion designer's snazzy belt buckles. The court reversed a summary
judgment denying copyright protection on the grounds that plaintiff's
97
belt buckles were utilitarian works.

95. An interesting pair of lighting fixtures were the subject of the leading cases on preemption of state unfair competition laws under the patent laws of the United States. Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964). A sixties fad,.pole lamps, was the subject of Sears. Compco involved an industrial fixture
for fluorescent lights. The distinctive design of the lighting fixture in Compco had the function of
increasing the strength of the feature, and could not be protected by the approach suggested here.
The status of the pole lamps in Sears is less clear.
96. 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
97. Id. at 994.
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The court began by declaring that "[t] his case is on a razor's edge
of copyright law." 98 That metaphor implies a sharp division, whereas
the court's analysis provides no bright lines. Even the pictures of the
belt buckles are hazy. 99 The majority decision declares that it is "necessary to determine whether . . .there is a physically or conceptually
separable artistic sculpture or carving capable of existing independently
as a work of art."10 0 The court concludes by stating "[w]e see in appellant's belt buckles conceptually separable sculptural elements." 10 1 No
attempt is made to describe those elements or show their existence independent of the utilitarian aspects of the belt buckle. The necessary
result is to protect the overall shape of the buckle.
The exclusion of "overall shape," which seemed inappropriate in
Esquire, is not inconsistent with the statute when applied to a belt
buckle. A belt buckle allows no opening for the "rip-its-guts-out" approach. Its shape, unlike that of the light fixture housing, cannot easily
be distinguished from its function. It is possible, however, using the
"hacksaw" approach, to divide each Kieselstein-Cord buckle approximately in half vertically. In each case, one half contains the tongue of
the buckle and a simple square metal frame through which the belt
passes. The other half of each buckle contains most of the unique and
decorative features. Certainly, protection of that part would fully protect the creator from blatant "knock-offs." In each case, the piece of
metal can be physically separated and can exist independently, leaving
behind a functioning buckle and thus satisfying the statute.
Whatever coherence and aesthetic appeal the metalwork may have
comes from its graceful incorporation into a buckle. When the functioning elements are separated, what remains is a lump of metal no
longer attractive to bourgeois taste. Though unattractive in itself, each
non-functional remainder is the deliberate and original creation of the

98. Id. at 990.
99. The belt buckles in question are vaguely depicted in the district court's opinion. Kieselstein-Cord, 489 F. Supp. 732, 733 (1980). In the court of appeals' opinion, the belt buckles are
somewhat more clearly depicted in a photo which shows the relation to the belt. 632 F.2d at 995.
Perhaps because of the reflective precious metal surfaces, the pictures are somewhat mysterious.

Clearer photos, but without belts attached, are found in M.
COPYRIGHT 70 (1985).

NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON

100. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 994. The "work of art" reference is drawn from regulations under the old statute, and runs counter to the clearly expressed Congressional intent to
eliminate aesthetic questions. See supra text accompanying note 22. Although the court states the
statutory formula correctly, this slip shows the orientation toward protecting art rather than toward freeing utility. The opinion also makes much of the fact, irrelevant under the new Act, that
some trendy New Yorkers wore these belt buckles on shortened belts around the neck or elsewhere
on their bodies. Kieselstein-Cord,632 F.2d at 993. Apart from the fact that buckles are functional
when fastening belts, whether or not they hold up pants, even if the buckle, or a gear or a wrench,
were worn as a brooch or displayed on a pedestal, the independence of its shape from its function
would not
established. 1990
Published
bybeeCommons,
101. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993.
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designer, and almost surely qualifies as original and creative enough for
copyright. This divisive method will be more satisfying than the court's
approach for those who insist on knowing what "sculptural feature"
has been judged separate from and independent of the utilitarian aspects of the buckle. As Judge Weinstein remarked in his dissent: "The
artist has enhanced the appearance of the buckles by rendering their
shape aesthetically pleasing without interfering with function. It is the
originator's success in completely integrating the artistic designs and
the functional aspects of the buckles that preclude [sic] copyright."1 02
Judge Weinstein did not consider the possibility of a physical division
of the buckle.
Furthermore, the shape of the Kieselstein-Cord buckle did not involve any advance in functional design. Copyright protection would not
create a monopoly in any original method of buckling. The fragmentary protection suggested here would never permit a copyright holder to
monopolize any special utilitarian value which an original design might
incorporate.
V.

THE LATER CASES

The Kieselstein-Cord case established a pattern of greater attention. to the "conceptual separability" found in the legislative history
than for the words of the statute, and greater attention to the conceptual than to the physical aspects of the work. The next two important
Second Circuit cases added to this pattern a concern for abstract theory. The facts presented in Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover
Corp.10 - and Brandir International v. Cascade Pacific Lumber' 4 are
particularly illuminating. The theories presented in these cases illustrate primarily the defects of the pattern described above.
A.

Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.

In Barnhart., the Second Circuit grappled with four styrofoam torsos to clarify the rule of Kieselstein-Cord1 0 5 Plaintiff, the producer of
forms for the display of shirts and sweaters, sought protection for two
models which simulated a male and female torso. 0 6 Copyright registration was sought after copying was discovered, and such registration was
granted in one day. The Copyright Office's approval, however, did not
bar the district court from reconsidering the question of whether the

102. Id. at 994 (Weinstein, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
103. 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
104. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
105. Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 418-19.
106. Id. at 412. Two other models included in the lawsuit came with sculpted shirts to be
used for displaying jackets. Id. For simplicity, this analysis will be limited to the unclothed torsos.
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article was suitable for copyright due to its utilitarian nature.1 0 7 Sum-

10 8
mary judgment for defendant was upheld on appeal.
The majority again ignored the requirement of independent existence, or equated it to separability. This case can be distinguished from
Kieselstein-Cord, since "the ornamented surfaces of the buckles were
not in any respect required by their utilitarian functions."109 Contrastingly, the artistic features of the Barnhart forms, "the life-size configuration of the breasts and the width of-the shoulders, are inextricably
intertwined with the utilitarian feature; the display of clothes." 0
Judge Newman in a lengthy and challenging dissent declared that
the majority had misunderstood or misapplied "the interesting though
esoteric issue of 'conceptual separability.' "I" After stating the statutory definition requiring both separability and independent existence,
Judge Newman quoted the House Report that there must be " 'some
element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable
from the utilitarian aspects of that~article.' "1I2 He then pointed out
that "[iun this Circuit it is settled, and the majority does not dispute,
that 'conceptual separability' is distinct: from 'physical separability'
and, when present, entitles the creator of a useful article to a copyright on its design.""'
In attempting to harmonize Kieselstein-Cord with Esquire and
other cases, Judge Newman not only elevates a term in the legislative
history as a substitute for the two-part statutory requirement, he pursues the logic of this substitution rigorously, to a point where the majority cannot follow. To refute Judge Newman satisfactorily, the majority would have had to qualify their approval of Kieselstein-Cord,
which they were unwilling to do.
In a provocative footnote, the dissent distinguishes the idea of
"functionality" applied in trademark law to prevent capture under the
guise of "trade dress" of a utilitarian design feature." 4 Judge Newman
declares that "copyright law, however, does not deny copyright protection to a design simply because the design features ate functional. If
the design engenders a concept that is separable from the concept of

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 594 F. Supp 364, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 412.
Id. at 419.
Id.
Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 420 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5668). The two references in the same paragraph denying protection to the overall shape of the useful article are, not surprisingly, omitted.
113. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 420 n.l.
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the utilitarian function, the design is copyrightable." 115 This startling
conclusion expresses a judgment of the policy behind the limitation on
useful works. Rather than seeing an attempt to preserve competition in
functional objects, Judge Newman apparently believes that the primary
purpose of the statutory provisions is to limit the coverage of copyright
to those classy objects that can be called "art."
Conceding that copyright law will permit a designer to capture the
value of useful designs, Judge Newman goes on to create a test which
the majority aptly describes as a "bottomless pit." 1 6 Judge Newman
carefully notes a possible danger: "Some might think that the requisite
separability of concepts exists whenever the design of a form engenders
in the mind of the ordinary observer any concept that is distinct from
the concept of the form's utilitarian function." 1 7 But no! To go so far
"would subvert the Congressional effort to deny copyright protection to
designs of useful articles that are aesthetically pleasing." ' To be more
faithful to Congressional intent we must allow protection "only when
the non-utilitarian concept can be entertained in the mind of the ordinary observer without at the same time contemplating the utilitarian
function." 11
One factor prompting Judge Newman to this extraordinary proposal is the nature of the work in question. Human torsos are a typical
subject for traditional art. The majority cast doubt on this conclusion
on the grounds that "[i]t would only be by concealing the open, hollowed-out rear half of the object, which is obviously designed to facilitate pinning or tucking in of garments, that an illusion of a sculpture
can be created."' 20 Artists working in ceramics, however, create exactly
this type of hollow-backed torsos, so Judge Newman is more accurate
on this point. 21
Professor Brown also questions the artistic standing of the works
in question: "The mannequins in Barnhart-I have seen them-are
flimsy styrofoam shells. Frontal photographs create a solid sculptural
impression that is quite lacking in the objects themselves.", 2" The statutory definition of copy provides that "[t]he term 'copies' includes the
material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.

Id. at 419.
Id. at 423.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 419 n.5.
For example, see the ceramic torso by artist Ron Cooper pictured in Eye on. . .Hopper at Home, HARPERs' BAZAAR, May 1990, at 119.
122. Brown, Design Protection:An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1351 (1987).
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fixed." 123 Professor Brown's objection relates to the copy, not to the
work."2 4
Accepting Judge Newman's artistic nature of the work, the majority's characterization of the resulting "bottomless pit" remains accurate. The majority properly notes that the inquiry into the ordinary
observer's concepts will require expert testimony and opinion surveys.
The opinion notes that the public has been manipulated to accept
Campbell soup can labels as works of art, and more could be said along
this line.1 1 5 We must consider that confusion as to what is an "art object" is widespread, 2 ' and that the legislative history of the 1976 Act
clearly indicates that the change in statutory language. from "work of
art" to "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work" was intended to eliminate such questions.
The availability of experts to testify on either side of more scientific questions is a cause for skepticism, if not scandal. The mental operation required to testify as to the question raised by Judge Newman's
test presents an amusing challenge, requiring of witnesses a mental effort comparable to the (presumably impossible) test for initiation into
the White Bear Club: Sit in the corner for one-half hour and do not
1 27
think of a white bear.
Neither the majority nor the dissent considered dividing the
dummy into utilitarian and non-utilitarian elements. An imagined
physical division again illustrates the problem of utility arising from
simple physical properties. The Barnhart forms can be divided in two
by the crude physical approach suggested. Application of the "hacksaw" approach can divide each display form by slicing vertically with a
blade that extends from shoulder to shoulder. The remains are two
solid styrofoam shells of comparable height, breadth and curvature, but

123. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
124. The term "work" is undefined in the statute, but by the definition of the term "copy"
quoted, it is clear that the "work" is an abstraction, prior to any particular example. Thus, using
the common meaning of the word "idea," it may accurately be stated that the Copyright Act
protects nothing but "ideas." Section 102(b), of course, provides that "[i]n no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea . . . regardless of the form in
which it is . . .embodied in such work." Id. § 102(b). The philosophically peculiar theory of the
Act appears to be that an idea is embodied in a work, which is distinct from any physical rendering or copy (and thus itself disembodied). This set of givens should provide the metaphysicians
with so much to chew on that useful objects could be left to cruder minds for the present.
125. Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 n.5. (2d Cir. 1985).
126. For a serious consideration from outside the art world, see generally E. BANFIELD, THE
DEMOCRATIC MUSE (1984).
127. The suitable expert testimony would have to take the form: Though I cannot now
contemplate this torso without being aware of both aspects, I recall that when first the lawyer
presented it to me, for a brief period I wavered between thinking of it exclusively as an art object
and thinking of it exclusively as a shirt dummy. No one familiar with literary art criticism and the
general availability of expert testimony would expect difficulty in finding suitable witnesses.
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reduced depth. One has the back of the unaltered form and a smooth,
curved rectangular front. The other has the front of the unaltered mannequin with the bulges and cavities of human form, and a smooth
sliced back. Each is suitable for the display of garments.
This approach might have been a convenient, unmetaphysical resolution of the issue of copyrightability; the division does not exclude utility from the sculptured shape, therefore, protection should be unavailable. The "hacksaw" can work again, however, to sever a segment of the
contoured form, the breasts, preferably, as the most distinctive segment; the left or right half of the form would serve as well. By this
device a portion is obtained which has no utility, and protection of
which will prevent mechanical duplication without restraining competition in similar objects.
Without such a division, the contoured shape, as well as its uncontoured substrate, is useful for displaying shirts because of its simple
physical dimensions-height and width comparable to a human torso.
It will be argued in a later section that such simple properties cannot
be captured by copyright, and ought not be used to justify a determination that sculptural properties have not been separated from useful
elements.12
The contoured shape has another sort of utility, which is equally
awkward for analysis. The extra advantage conveyed by the human
contours is a more attractive appearance for the articles of clothing
displayed on the form. This is a very tenuous sort of utility, quite close
to Judge Joiner's analysis, rejected by the Sixth Circuit, of the utility
of a toy airplane: "[I]t permits a child to dream and to let his or her
imagination soar."129 The contoured form may be more "useful" than a
simple rectangle to a merchant because it may have slightly more aesthetic appeal to customers. Such "mercantile utility" cannot be accepted without unacceptable corollaries."' Certainly, display props are

128. See infra text accompanying notes 142-51.
129. Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 522 F. Supp. 622, 625 (E.D. Mich. 1981), vacated,
703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1983). Though Judge Joiner's attempt to establish utility from the child's
viewpoint was reversed, neither the district court nor the court of appeals dealt with the question
from the point of view of the parent. The toy is useful because you give it to your children and get
a few minutes of quiet. The "utilitarian aspect" here is novelty, which is not copyrightable, and
analogous to the utility that arises from simple physical properties. More recently, the exclusion of
toys from the class of "utilitarian object" has been ignored by the Copyright Office in the case of
the "Koosh" ball. See OddzOn Prods. Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
130. If, for example, it were established that displaying shirts on hangers resulted in sales of
x, use of the Barnhart forms resulted in sales of 1.2x, and display of the shirts draped across a
painting resulted in sales of 1.5x, would that make the painting a useful article within the meaning of the Copyright Act? A similar, though unresolved case involved showcases for.eyeglasses,
which derived utility from simple physical properties and from beauty. Trans-World Mfg. Corp v.
Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 95 (D. Del. 1982), later proceedings (with pictures of the
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useful to merchants as would be recorded music, or perfume sprayed in
the store-air useful for a seduction. The statutory definition of "useful
article" requires an "intrinsic utilitarian function," and the utility
which comes from perceived beauty should not be used to prevent a
finding that sculptural features have been separated from utilitarian aspects of a work.
In Barnhart, neither the majority nor the dissent considered
whether granting protection would permit the copyright proprietor to
capture the value of the function of a mannequin torso for display of
shirts and sweaters. It seems obvious that the basic dimensions suitable
for display of garments could not be monopolized, nor could the idea of
human contours. Had protection been granted to plaintiff's design,
competition would be unaffected, barring an exact reproduction of the
protected form.
B.

Brandir International Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.

It has been suggested, despite the court of appeals decision, and
contrary to the Congressional intent suggested by the House Report,
that the statutory language of the 1976 Act, if applicable, would have
required that the lighting fixtures in Esquire receive copyright protection because the wiring could be ripped out. It has also been suggested
that both the majority and dissenting opinions in Kieselstein-Cord
overlooked a crude but honest analysis that would have secured protection and consistency with the statute by cutting apart the "work of
art." In Barnhart, both the majority and the dissent concentrated on
theory, perhaps because physical division of the article into a useful
and a non-useful portion was particularly challenging due to the utility
arising from simple physical properties.
In the next leading case, Brandir International,Inc. v. Cascade
Pacific Lumber Co.,' 3 1 the Register of Copyright denied registration to
an article the design of which did not permit division into sculptural
and useful features. 132 The simple bicycle rack at issue integrated form
and function so perfectly that any protection against copying the overall shape would grant a monopoly in a shape both efficient and attractive. 3' The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on this occasion
display cases), 750 F.2d 1552, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Summary judgment was withheld to permit
testimony on "conceptual separability," and further reports of the controversy involve only the
status of design patents. Id.
131. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
132. Id. at 1143.
133. Another limitation of patent protection, as compared to copyright, is illustrated by this
designer's failure to secure protection before marketing the design. Whatever possibilities the design may have had for a utility or design patent were lost when it was offered for sale. The
possibility of copyright protection, however, could still be asserted.
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departed from physical reality altogether and split over whether the
determining factor should concern the state of mind of the actual designer, or that of an imaginary observer. 13 '
The bicycle rack can be described simply as a length of pipe that
begins with an upright section the height of a bicycle wheel. The pipe is
then bent into a regular 180" (half circle) curve from which another
vertical section descends to a similar curve just touching the ground. A
bicycle wheel fits under each top curve and over each bottom curve.
The number of segments can be extended to fit available space. The
racks are widely seen at newer high school and college buildings.
The design is so simple and integrated that there literally is nothing but the overall shape. "Conceptual separation" of "artistic elements" cannot lead to copyright protection which leaves utilitarian aspects free to be copied. Nevertheless, the court of appeals found it
difficult to apply the statute without the help of a theory. The majority
chose the formula provided by Professor Denicola. 135 This formula asserts that the "statutory Criterion limiting protection . . .should be
viewed as an attempt to identify elements whose form and appearance
reflect the unconstrained perspective of the artist."' 6 More simply,
copyrightability should depend on the extent to which the work reflects
artistic expression uninhibited by functional considerations.
Judge Winter, in a dissenting opinion, followed the theory proposed by Judge Newman (who dissented in Barnhart), which requires a
determination of whether the ordinary observer could purify its mind of
the thought of usefulness. 3 7 Both theories violate the apparent Congressional purpose to preserve competition as to useful aspects of articles, and demonstrate the preference of the courts to protect art rather
than competition.' 3
In the district court, it appears that plaintiff had attempted to conform the facts to the Denicola theory. This was done by contending
that the configuration of pipe at issue was created as a work of art and
its useful qualities were noted later. 3 9 The court of appeals, while ac-

134. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
135. Id. at 1145-47.
136. Denicola, supra note 88, at 742. Note the direct conflict of this formula with the language of H.R. REP. No. 1476, "even if the appearance of an article is determined by esthetic (as
opposed to functional) considerations .
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 5; see also supra
text accompanying note 27.
137. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1151 (Winter, J.,
dissenting).
138. The District of Columbia Circuit has reserved judgment on the Brandir test, while
holding that the Copyright Office did not abuse its discretion in relying on this test to deny copyright to the "Koosh" ball. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v..
Oman, 924 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
139. "In their motion papers the parties debate whether Levine first created his object as a
piece of minimalist sculpture, only subsequently perceiving its utility as a bicycle rack (as Brandir
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/3
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cepting the theory, made light of this factual possibility, drawing from
the deposition of the designer to describe the way a businessman's
hobby of bending wire into "art" led a friend to note that the shape of
one of artworks suggested a bike rack. 1 0 The deposition of David Levine, the designer/businessman, is notable because of his calculated
testimony on the question of separability:
Q. Would you explain how you can separate the sculpture [sic] feature
which you have described from the utilitarian feature of the rack?
A. The sculptural features of the rack are totally separate from its utilitarian features.
Q. How can you separate them?
A. Because it was a piece of sculpture. And the fact that it can be used
as a bicycle rack is a purely accidental event.
Q. When you separate the sculptural features from the utilitarian features, what do you have left?
A. I cannot separate the sculptural features from the utilitarian features
in the manner in which-to me, this is my sculpture ....Il
The final question of this cross-examination is remarkable. It'suggests that there are two entities to be considered when the question of
separability, and capability of independent existence are presented: that
for which protection is sought, and that which will not be protected. It
was previously contended that this suggestion describes the process
which most clearly satisfies the statutory language. Even if separation
is achieved conceptually, there must be two entities, for example the
wrapping paper and the design printed on it, for separation and independence to be found.
VI.

THE UTILITY OF SIMPLE PHYSICAL PROPERTIES

The approach suggested here reached satisfactory results when applied to the reported cases. Protection can usually be afforded to attractive designs with clear analysis, by strictly adhering to statutory language, and by relying primarily on physical description and division of
the article rather than vague references to protected shape as "artistic
features" or "ornamental aspects." Theories dependent on evidence of
mental processes of creators or critics are unnecessary. Most importantly, competition in original useful designs is carefully preserved.
Unfortunately, the approach does not help with the class of articles whose utility is derived not primarily from the quality of their de-

contends); or whether Levine set out to design and manufacture a bicycle rack in the first place
(as Cascade contends)." Brandir Int'l, Inc., 1986 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 26,017, at 20,690.
140. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1146.
141. 1986 Copyright L. Dec. 26,017, at 20,691 (quoting Transcript at 12).
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sign, but from simple physical properties. The 1976 Act defines "useful
article" as "an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not
merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information." 14 2 This includes such articles as paperweights and boxes, and requires that copyright in imaginative designs for such articles be subject
to the limitations in the coverage of useful articles included in the definition of "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works." Analysis of more
complex useful articles may be complicated to the extent that part of
their utility stems from such simple properties.
Examples of utility arising from simple physical properties will be
described to demonstrate the problem they create for interpretation of
the statutory language. An interpretation of the statute will be offered
which may solve these problems while clarifying others.
A bust of Beethoven can be used as a paperweight .or a doorstop.
This is true of any three-dimensional object with sufficient mass. Professor Denicola mentions this example, noting that analogies to baby
carriages or food processors "seem silly," and concluding that "[e]ven
if the statutory description of useful articles should happen to encompass all three, we would expect the bust to survive the subsequent analysis with full copyright protection intact. 14 3 He suggests that our expectation is justified because the form of the bust is independent of its
utility. Coming after the concession that the statutory definition encompasses the bust, as well as the baby carriage, his confidence depends on
the questionable willingness of judges to rely on intuition despite apparently contradictory statutory language. Furthermore, we cannot be confident that the protection proposed would extend to an aesthetically
pleasing abstract design of a solid object intended to be used as a
paperweight.
Another simple physical property accounting for the utility of an
object is the quality of having a hollow inside and a closable opening.
Bags,1"' boxes, 14 5 and coin banks 1 6 were involved in several cases
under the 1909 Act at a time when the applicable regulations contained the requirements of separability and independent existence
picked up in the 1976 Act. In each of these cases the Copyright Office

142. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
143. Denicola, supra note 88, at 729.
144. R. Dakin & Co. v. A & L Novelty Co., 444 F. Supp. 1080 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (stuffed
animal functioning as pajama bag and pillow).
145. Dan Kasoff, Inc. v. Gresco Jewelry Co., 204 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
146. Goldman-Morgen, Inc. v. Dan Brechner & Co., 411 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Royalty Designs, Inc. v. Thifticheck Serv. Corp., 204 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). In L. Batlin
& Son, Inc. v. Snyder, the holding disapproved copyright in a bank for lack of originality. 394 F.
Supp. 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affid en banc, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976). Usefulness was not
mentioned.
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had registered the work, and the copier did not raise the question of
whether these utilitarian objects were properly the subject of copyright.
Cellini's famous salt cellar, occasionally mentioned in the context of
utility also belongs to this class.
In Act Young Imports v. B and E Sales,1 4 a copier challenged
registration of backpacks shaped like animals under the 1976 Act. Citing both Barnhart and Kieselstein-Cord, the district court declared,
"[e]xamination of the backpacks yields the conclusion . . . that the artistic aspect of the backpack, that is the animal image, is separate from
the useful function of the packs."""8 As in Kieselstein-Cord, there was
no effort to describe what "artistic aspect" was capable of existing independently. Similarly, the facts do not indicate whether a separable
animal shape was attached to an enclosure of regular shape, or whether
the enclosure shared the animal shape.
The difficulties of applying the statute to boxes and bags can be
illustrated by imagining an unadorned box with an attractive abstract
shape, the same for both exterior and interior, and with no decorative
aspects other than the overall shape. Unlike the Esquire design, which
permitted the working parts to be torn from the hollow casing, in the
case proposed, the utility comes from the hollowness itself. 149 On the
one hand, the work cannot be separated into two independently existing
entities, one which is decorative and one which is useful. On the other
hand, no one could interpret a copyright in the article in such a way
that the copyright holder appropriated the utilitarian function of a box.
An unexpected example of the problem created when utility arises
from simple physical properties was noticed by the authors of a prominent casebook on copyright. 150 They cited a newspaper story of a small
electronics firm marketing a compact radio antenna. 5 When the antenna was redesigned in the form of a modern sculpture orders increased by 500%.152 The antenna is constructed of wire in which an
electrical current can be induced, and its utility springs from that property. A straight wire has the best conductivity, so it is not likely that
the sculptural shape has a unique utility.
The cases discussed previously include two additional examples of
utility arising from simple physical properties. In the Esquire case, the

147. 667 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
148. Id. at 87.
149. The Esquire housing presents the additional utilitarian aspect that it shields the wiring
from the elements and from persons who might harm or be harmed. This aspect of the housing's
utility springs entirely from its hollowness, and can be approached in the same way as the utility
of bags and boxes.
150. R. BROWN & R. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT 181.(1990).
151. Id.
152. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1989, at F3, col. 1.
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housing's utility came in part from its height and in part from its hollowness. The human contours of the Barnhart torsos, taken as a whole,
could not be separated from utilitarian aspects becatise any upright
solid with height, width, and depth approximating those of a human
torso can be used to display shirts. Each case suggests a crude evasion
of part of the problem by seeking copyright protection for only a part
of the article, the top disk of the light fixture, the surface of the breasts
of the torso. The approach of seeking a part to protect does not work
with paperweights and aerials, nor will it work with simple enclosures-boxes of original shape. It must be acknowledged that the elaborate theories propounded in Barnhart and Brandir apply as easily to
cases of utility arising from simple physical properties as ,they do to any
other sort of object. This flexibility does not make up for their defects.
An attempt to use the idea of "conceptual separability" to analyze
paperweights and boxes points towards the inadequacy of that device.
The shape of a paperweight can easily be conceived apart from its utility. Imagine a hologram, or a version of the shape in paper. If no attempt is made to conceive what is left behind after the shape is removed, this approach works well for paperweights. Unfortunately it
works equally well for gears, or saw blades.
The difficulty of applying the statute to these hypothetical cases
involving simple physical properties points toward a latent ambiguity in
the statutory language, features that can be identified separately from,
and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of
the article. The difficulties are minimized if separability and independent existence are sought in light of the obvious purpose of the limitation which is to remove utilitarian aspects from copyright protection. A
sculptural feature should be judged as qualifying for copyright protection if it can be conceived separate and independent in such a way as to
be capable of receiving copyright protection which would not necessarily extend to the utilitarian aspects of the object. The utilitarian aspects from which separation must be imagined should only include
those sufficiently original to be possible subjects for copyright protection barring the statutory limitation. Weight, height, and conductivity
are examples of uncopyrightable useful qualities difficult to imagine as
existing separately, but which should not thereby disqualify a design
from protection.
This simple interpretation allows the shapes of boxes, bags, paperweights and aerials to be protected without difficult analysis. As applied to the principal cases, it would allow protection to the Esquire
light fixture housing and the contoured surface of the Barnhart mannequin. It would not affect the analysis of the Kieselstein-Cord buckle,
but protection for a segment, as suggested earlier, would remain possihttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/3
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ble. The Brandir bike rack would still present no feature which could
be isolated from its utility in such a way as to permit copyright coverage which would not also extend to the utilitarian aspects.
VII.

CONCLUSION

This article demonstrates that a simple-minded application of the
statutory language to the facts of the leading cases reaches satisfactory
and predictable results. This approach permits copyright protection to
be extended to a wide range of attractive utilitarian designs and avoids
both aesthetic judgments and dependence on the unverifiable mental
states of imaginary beholders, venal experts or interested designers.
Unlike the leading cases, this approach does not ignore the statutory requirement that an aspect to be protected must be "capable of
existing independently of the utilitarian aspects of the work." That language is given effect by considering the work which is divided, either
physically or conceptually, into two describable portions. One portion
retains a utilitarian function and may not be protected. The other portion, which may or may not be aesthetically pleasing, and may not be
useful, is the work to be .protected by copyright.
This analysis considered the problem of the utility of simple physical properties. This difficulty was first realized with the suggestion that
small works of art could hardly be separated from their potential use,
for example, paperweights. The functional aspect of a paperweight is,
however, analogous to the functional aspects of many other objects including boxes, aerials and Caryatids. Non-recognition of such as "useful articles" would circumvent the statutory definition. Denying copyright protection to the shapes of these articles appears contrary to
common sense. The solution of this conundrum is to recognize the ambiguity of the language by which protection of useful articles is limited,
and to interpret the language which allows the broadest extent of copyright protection in a manner that will never permit copyright protection
to extend to useful features.
Eagerness to protect "art" has created a theoretical muddle; concentration on protecting competition clarifies the situation, and still
permits protection of all but the most purely utilitarian designs.
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